Can scientific naturalism be defined without making it either false or empty?

Hempel’s dilemma presents naturalists and physicalists with an apparent choice. If their position is defined by reference to present-day science, it risks being overturned by future discoveries. If it is defined by reference to an ideal future science, it seems to lose any definite content.

This article examines two influential responses to the dilemma, developed by David Papineau and Andrew Melnyk, before proposing a more substantive solution. Drawing on Sean Carroll’s notion of the Core Theory and on the role of effective theories in contemporary physics, it argues that the physical laws relevant to everyday phenomena are far more stable than the dilemma initially suggests.

The result is a form of naturalism that is empirically grounded, ontologically substantial, and open to revision without being threatened by every future development in fundamental physics. The article concludes by identifying a major unresolved difficulty: the absence of a consensual ontology for quantum mechanics.

Themes: naturalism, physicalism, Hempel’s dilemma, effective theories, Core Theory, scientific realism, quantum mechanics

Adrien Vila Valls, 2026

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